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ABSTRACT
LINDSAY REID: Examining Leverage in Civil War Mediation: A Dynamic Theory of
Mediator Leverage
(Under the direction of Mark Crescenzi.)
How does leverage vary across different mediator types and what influence does this
have on mediation outcomes? Extant literature has glossed over the meaning of lever-
age, treating it as a static measure of material power. I argue that leverage is a dynamic
concept comprised of two dimensions: capability and credibility. Capability leverage is
a function of economic and military might while credibility leverage derives its influ-
ence from material, historical, religious, and cultural ties. I hypothesize that mediators
with capability leverage will be more likely to achieve short-term success in the form
of a negotiated settlement while mediators with credibility leverage will be more likely
to achieve a more durable peace. I test my hypotheses using the universe of civil war
mediation attempts from 1989-2006. My results suggest that capability leverage does
indeed contribute to the achievement of a settlement while credibility leverage leads to
more durable outcomes.
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Introduction
Civil wars are more deadly and more durable than interstate conflicts. Given their
intensity, policymakers and scholars alike have been struggling to find ways to mitigate
the deadly effects of civil war. A common strategy in the quest to resolve conflict is
the use of third-party mediation. Mediation’s effects on civil conflict, however, have
been mixed. Countless war torn countries, such as Sudan and Rwanda, have experi-
enced numerous mediation attempts, only to see war resume soon after. To account
for variations in mediation success, scholars such as Beardsley (2011) have considered
the effects that different mediation strategies have on mediation outcomes. How do
different mediators, and their respective mediation styles, influence the mediation pro-
cess? More specifically, though, I seek to explore how leverage varies across different
mediator types and what role this has on mediation outcomes.
Why is the study of mediation leverage important within the broader study of civil
war resolution? First and foremost, scholars have glossed over the meaning of leverage
within the mediation context, equating the concept with material power. By treating
leverage as a fairly static concept, however, existing studies have not fully conceptu-
alized the dynamic roles that different mediators might play in civil war mediation.
Second, unpacking the meaning of leverage is important insofar as it will help the in-
ternational community gain a better understanding of which strategies are and are not
successful for reaching peaceful settlements. Not all mediators are created equally; each
has a unique tool to bring to the mediation process. This study, then, builds a dynamic
conception of leverage in order to capture more nuanced determinants of mediation
success.
In what follows, I develop a theory of mediation leverage that contains two funda-
mental components: capability and credibility. Capability leverage captures the extent
to which mediators can use economic and military strength to coerce a negotiated set-
tlement. In other words, capability leverage involves the use of carrots and sticks to
alter the bargaining range and overcome commitment problems. Credibility leverage,
on the other hand, refers to a mediator’s historical, material, and cultural ties to the par-
ties within a conflict. If a mediator has credibility leverage within a specific mediation
attempt, they will tend to have a strong rapport with the actors involved. The medi-
ator therefore will be able to use commitment and information mechanisms to shape
the mediation process. I hypothesize that capability leverage increases the likelihood
of achieving short-term success in the form of a negotiated settlement while credibility
leverage leads to a more durable peace following a civil war.
In the following section, I discuss the role leverage has played in existing conflict
mediation literature. Importantly, I highlight how leverage has been predominantly
treated as a static concept. I then move to a presentation of my theory about the dynamic
nature of leverage, and I consider the role that the components of leverage play on
mediation outcomes. Then, I test my hypotheses using all civil war mediation attempts
from 1989 through 2006 as reported in the Civil War Mediation dataset (DeRouen,
Bercovitch and Pospieszna 2011). I find general support for my expectations; capability
leverage increases the likelihood of achieving a settlement, while credibility leverage
increases the duration of peace following a civil war. Finally, I conclude with a number
of policy implications and ideas for future research.
Leverage in Conflict Mediation
A better comprehension of leverage is crucial to achieving a more complete picture
of civil war mediation. While the term leverage is used frequently throughout the litera-
ture, its meaning remains ambiguous. According to its usage in the literature, mediators
with “leverage” have the force necessary to successfully mediate conflicts. What in
practice, though, does this mean? Rather than accepting leverage as an understood yet
undefined concept, I seek to unpack its meaning. If leverage truly is a key to mediator
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success, then it is crucial to understand what leverage is and how mediators use it to
alter the mediation process.
Below, I provide an overview of existing mediation research. Particularly, I focus
on discussions of mediation strategies and mediator types. Mediation strategies and the
actors involved in mediation are very diverse; a one-size-fits-all strategy for mediation
success does not exist. Moreover, there has been a lack of adequate attention to mediator
leverage within these works. Leverage is not a static measure of a mediator’s material
or military might but rather, it is a dynamic concept that is comprised of a diverse
array of mediator strategies. Giving attention to a discussion of mediation strategies
and the ambiguous usage of leverage, then, serves as a foundation to the theoretical
development of dynamic mediator leverage that follows.
Diverse Mediation Strategies
While mediation efforts include a broad spectrum of activities, mediation strategies
can be divided into two broad categories. The first of these categories includes a range
of low- or minimal-intervention strategies. The second category of mediation strategies
involves a greater degree of intervention and force. Variation in mediation strategies
is expected to have observable implications on the style and outcome of the mediation
itself.
At the low-intervention end of the mediation continuum, Bercovitch and Houston
(2000) describe communication-facilitation strategies. For these strategies, mediators
adopt a more “passive role, channeling information to the parties, facilitating coopera-
tion” but exerting little formal control over mediation (175). By enabling cooperation
and communication, these mediation strategies act as “confidence” or “trust” mediators,
two terms that Svensson (2007b) uses to denote pure mediation strategies. Pure media-
tors lack both resources and specific interests in conflicts (232). Svensson (2007b) cites
Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994) in stating that pure mediators instead follow a strategy
that “tries to get confidence of the parties, avoid participants’ loss of image, enhance
communication, and build social ties among the parties.”
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Beardsley (2009; 2011) categorizes mediators at the low-intervention end of the
spectrum as “weak mediators.” Weak mediators are confined to light mediation, or me-
diation without leverage. While this does not make the mediation ineffective per se,
it greatly limits the range of the mediator’s actions (2011). Beardsley (2009) writes
that weak mediators have “limited faculties” (274). This makes them an attractive op-
tion for belligerent parties who want to stall the peace process; weak mediators, in this
framework, have no means of pressuring combatants to come to an agreement.
In contrast to passive or low-intervention forms of mediation, mediation strategies
at the other end of the spectrum utilize much more force. According to Bercovitch
and Houston (2000), the highest form of intervention is that of directive strategies;
these affect the content and substance of bargaining, often involve ultimatums, and
directly alter the way issues are framed. Beardsley (2009; 2011) refers to directive or
manipulative strategies as heavy mediation and states that only “strong” mediators are
able to pursue such strategies. Strong mediators have leverage and are able to use carrots
and sticks to directly alter the costs of conflict and benefits of cooperation.
In a similar vein, Svensson (2007b) dichotomizes mediation strategies as well.
Power mediators have resources and/or interests that invest them more fully in the
conflict. More specifically, a power mediator “uses its economic, military, and political
resources to pull or push the parties in their preferred direction, takes measures in order
to secure its own interests in the country of the conflict, and exercises its leverage over
the parties in order to make them comply” (Svensson 2007b, 230). Again, within this
framework mediators who are powerful or strong wield leverage and thus, they are able
to coerce an agreement between the warring parties.
What benefits does the use of mediation with leverage bring? In other words, why
do many mediators pursue directive strategies or heavy mediation? Beardsley (2009)
highlights four benefits of pursuing a mediation strategy with leverage. First, such a
strategy alters the costs of the conflict, or more specifically, the costs of continuing
the conflict. Additionally, mediation with leverage increases the benefits of coopera-
tion, shapes the post-agreement environment through monitoring and enforcement, and
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helps to overcome information asymmetries. The heavy mediation strategy, however,
is based on the assumption that leverage and resources are virtually synonymous. Of
course, Beardsley is not alone in equating leverage with resources. Nevertheless, a more
nuanced conception of mediator leverage is needed to better understand what the term
means, how mediators use it, and what benefits it carries. In the theoretical framework
discussed later, I explicate why traditional uses of leverage are suboptimal and how they
limit the understanding of conflict mediation.
Who Does What: Examining the Choice of Mediation Strategy
Mediators are a diverse crowd, ranging from great powers to international and non-
governmental organizations to individuals. Each type of mediator brings a unique set of
skills to the mediation process. How does mediator type influence mediation strategies?
Svensson (2007b), for example, states that power mediators, or those with resources and
leverage, are comprised of great powers, regional powers, colonial powers, and neigh-
boring states. Pure mediators, or those without leverage or interests in the conflict, are
assumed to be international, regional, and non-governmental organizations, individuals,
and distant states. Svensson’s categorization of mediators and their respective strategies,
however, is based on assumption rather than systematic empirical tests. Such assump-
tions are endemic in extant literature. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) write that larger
states and the United Nations have leverage in mediation thus they are more effective at
managing intense conflicts. Beardsley (2011) indicates, “individuals, NGOs, and small
states are obvious examples of third parties that are typically unable to achieve enough
leverage to make much of a difference in shaping incentives relative to the stakes of the
conflict” (101).
While the above categorizations of mediators and their strategies may be accurate,
they are lacking in two key dimensions. First, the categorizations are based on seem-
ingly correlational assumptions. Rather than remaining content with such assumptions,
however, it is crucial to understand more fully the dynamics behind different mediators’
behavior. In other words, why is it assumed that organizations and smaller states are
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weak or without leverage? Second, the existing categorizations are based on a thin con-
ception of leverage. They are thus missing the dynamic dimensions of leverage and the
ways in which different mediators may exert different types of leverage over the medi-
ation process. By treating leverage as static, existing theories infer that large states, for
example, have leverage over all conflicts and that organizations do not have leverage
in any conflict. A dynamic theory of leverage, though, will create a more context-
dependent theory about mediators and their effectiveness. I delve into this second idea
in more detail in the theory section.
Brushing Over Leverage
The widespread assumption across the mediation and bargaining literature is that
leverage is a function of resources and force or an actor’s ability to use carrots and sticks
to coerce others. For example, Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991) treat leverage
as synonymous to resources and mediator power. Svensson (2007b) uses leverage to de-
scribe the ability of power mediators, immediately equating leverage to the economic,
military, and political resources that these mediators have. Kleiboer (1996) notes the
ambiguity attached to the use of leverage in studies of mediation. She writes that lever-
age makes for “fuzzy conceptualizations” and remains “one of the most elusive elements
of mediation” (371). Kleiboer highlights that few researchers bother to define what they
mean by leverage. The assumption is that leverage refers “to a mediator’s ability to put
pressure on one or both of the conflicting parties” (371). Treating leverage as a uni-
versally understood yet empirically undefined concept, however, risks ignoring crucial
aspects of conflict mediation. If leverage is an instrumental variable in conflict media-
tion yet its usage remains unclear, how can scholars really know how it influences the
mediation process?
Zartman and Touval (1985) indicate that leverage is indeed a dynamic topic. They
define leverage as the ability to add “arguments and inducements that make unattractive
proposals look attractive” (40). More specifically, however, Zartman and Touval explain
that leverage in mediation is drawn from three sources. First, leverage is derived from
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the belligerent parties need for a solution. In other words, “The greater the parties’
perceived need, the greater the mediator’s leverage” (41). Second, leverage depends
on the warring parties’ susceptibility to the shifting weight that the mediator can apply.
Lastly, leverage arises from the belligerents’ interest in side payments that the mediator
can offer or withhold (carrots and sticks). While Zartman and Touval explore leverage
more thoroughly than other mediation research, their analysis leaves many questions
unanswered. How and why do certain mediators have leverage while others do not?
Moreover, Zartman and Touval examine leverage from the demand side, or from the
side of the belligerent parties. What attributes of the mediators themselves contribute to
leverage?
Beardsley (2008) is the most recent to bring leverage back in to mediation research.
He hints at a more complex vision of leverage in discussing tangible versus intangible
leverage. Tangible leverage encompasses the assumed dimensions of leverage including
resources and carrots and sticks. Intangible leverage, on the other hand, refers to a
mediator’s ability to make promises or use prestige to mediate. Nevertheless, Beardsley
(2009) slips back to the equation of leverage with resources. With that being said,
little has been done to delve theoretically or empirically into the multiple dimensions
of leverage. Brushing over leverage remains a problem because, as aforementioned, it
ignores the contextual variations of leverage and prevents scholars from gaining a more
nuanced understanding of what does and does not work in conflict mediation.
A Dynamic Theory of Mediation Leverage
Leverage remains something that is assumed to be common knowledge. The use of
leverage in mediation, as demonstrated in the previous section, is most often equated
with material resources and military strength. I argue, however, that this vision of lever-
age reveals only a portion of the story. A reconceptualization of leverage is thus nec-
essary to capture its dynamic properties. Leverage represents any means available to a
mediator to influence the mediation process and to alter incentives for belligerents so
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they may reach an agreement. A mediator’s influence, though, cannot be assumed to
correlate with resources only. Instead, a mediator’s influence is a function of a num-
ber of properties of the mediator itself, both material and immaterial. Resources matter
but they do not hold a monopoly on mediator leverage. Less tangible characteristics
including but not limited to past interactions and personal ties give strength to a me-
diator vis-a`-vis the mediation process as well. Thus, I contend that leverage can be
conceptualized as an interaction between two different yet complimentary dimensions:
capability and credibility. While each dimension contributes a unique set of skills that a
mediator can use to help resolve a conflict, both play an important role in the hopes of
achieving a lasting agreement.
Capability leverage corresponds closely with the traditional assumptions of lever-
age. Thus, this first dimension includes measures of influence such as wealth, military
strength, and other material forms of coercive power. Capability leverage, to use the
words of Beardsley (2008), is the tangible dimension of leverage. Capability is essen-
tial for a more nuanced notion of leverage for it captures what most scholars have been
talking about with regards to leverage. Capability leverage contributes to a mediator’s
overall influence by giving that mediator the power to push negotiations, alter incentives
of negotiating parties, and add security guarantees to mediation efforts.
Credibility leverage, on the other hand, refers to the influence that mediators have
when they have a strong rapport with the belligerents. This second dimension of lever-
age is crucial in filling the void that prior mediation studies have left open. While most
existing mediation studies consider leverage in terms of the first dimension - capability
- few consider the influence of less material aspects of leverage. Psychological and/or
personal connections between the belligerents and the mediator, however, can have in-
credible weight over the path of the mediation process. Credibility leverage is likely
to influence the content of negotiations, the perceived commitment to the mediation
process, and the efficacy of communication throughout the mediation. Thus, credibil-
ity leverage holds as much influence over a mediation attempt as does the traditional,
tangible dimension of capability leverage; the influence, however, takes on a different
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form. Studies, then, must account for both dimensions of leverage in order to fully
comprehend the behavior of mediators and the effects their behavior has on mediation
outcomes.
By giving distinct attention to both capability and credibility leverage, I am recog-
nizing that there is no simple formula for leverage in mediation. Leverage is a dynamic
concept and should be treated as such if it is to be used as a variable in studies of conflict
mediation. I define each component of leverage below and further discuss why a more
dynamic conceptualization of leverage is important for mediation research. Importantly,
I consider which mediators are more likely to exert each dimension of leverage. I then
move to a more substantively interesting discussion: how do capability and credibility
leverage influence mediation outcomes?
Capability Leverage
Capability leverage is comprised of tangible dimensions that contribute to a media-
tor’s power and strength. Similar to hard power (Nye 1990), capability leverage involves
getting others to do what one wants through acts of coercion. In the context of media-
tion, then, this would be the use of a “big stick” to get an agreement signed. Mediators
with capability leverage coerce negotiating parties to sign an agreement; as is discussed
more fully in later sections, this coercion is often a quick yet insufficient solution to a
conflict. Nye (2004) argues that hard power grows out of a country’s military and eco-
nomic might. Capability leverage, as conceptualized in this study, is also a function of
economic and military power. I discuss each of these components of capability leverage
in turn below.1
1In future extensions of this paper, I hope to include a political measure of capability leverage as well. At
the current stage, I have been unable to access the necessary data to measure this dimension. Neverthe-
less, the political dimension of capability leverage is important because it refers to a mediator’s political
ability to take part in conflict mediation. Political capability encompasses the presence or absence of
institutional structures that contribute expertise to mediation. Importantly, the political dimension of
capability leverage acts as a proxy for whether or not a government or organization has the ability and
know-how to engage in foreign affairs and to expend energy and resources on conflict mediation. This
dimension of capability leverage empowers mediators insofar as it indicates their commitment to conflict
mediation and their ability to direct resources abroad to broker peace between warring groups. On the
surface, then, the economic and political components of capability leverage act as material mechanisms
to shape the mediation process. Thus, there are clear theoretical justifications for including a political
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Economic power, or wealth, contributes to a mediator’s capability leverage. Wealth
bestows upon mediators a broader or fancier “toolbox” for mediation. With economic
power, mediators are simply more capable of mediating conflicts in terms of funding
the process and maintaining a presence in the country for the duration of the mediation.
More importantly, though, mediators with economic might are able to use carrots and
sticks to expedite the mediation process. In other words, economic strength gives par-
ticular mediators the ability to shape the mediation process through their use of material
incentives and/or sanctions.
The second dimension of capability leverage is comprised of a military dimension.
Military strength is included under the broader category of capability leverage because
it gives mediators the ability to enforce any agreement that is reached. In other words,
military capability attaches a threat to mediation that alters incentives of belligerents to
negotiate. A potential military presence will make an agreement more likely because it
creates an environment where cheating will be less feasible and less likely. Mediators
with military capability are able to use enforcement mechanisms to increase incentives
for compliance and cooperation. Enforcement, as Beardsley writes, provides “another
means of overcoming bargaining failures” (2011, 34). Attaching an enforcement mech-
anism to mediation not only deters belligerents from cheating in the negotiation process,
but it also gives them confidence that the post-agreement reality will more or less reflect
the terms of the agreement.
Capability leverage in mediation, with its economic and military dimensions, alters
the costs of non-agreement and expands the number of mutually acceptable alternatives
to fighting (Beardsley 2011, 31). The economic and military capabilities of the media-
tor, of course, are relative to those of the government participating in the civil conflict.
Thus, capability leverage is not measured in absolute terms but is measured as a ratio of
a mediator’s leverage to that of the government. As such, a mediator’s capability is not
constant across time and space, but instead varies according to specific characteristics
of the mediator itself. The contextual nature of capability leverage sets it apart from
dimension of capability leverage, however the empirical measures are not readily available.
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traditional uses of leverage which treat the concept as static or constant.
Capability leverage, though, is merely one portion of the dynamic concept of lever-
age. By itself, capability leverage facilitates conflict mediation and increases the likeli-
hood of conflict resolution, but it does not capture the full potential of mediation. The
next section considers how less tangible and less material forms of influence contribute
to credibility leverage.
Credibility Leverage
As aforementioned, leverage is not merely synonymous with material resources or
power. Leverage is the ability of a mediator to influence a conflict and alter the incen-
tives of warring parties so that they may reach a peaceful settlement. This influence con-
tains immaterial characteristics of a mediator that nonetheless hold great weight during
the mediation process. Credibility leverage, then, can be compared to Nye’s conception
of soft power (1990; 2004). Soft power occurs when one actor gets other actors to want
what it wants (Nye 1990). More specifically, it involves “the ability to get what you
want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye 2004, 256). Like soft
power, then, credibility leverage is an essential dimension of leverage because it gives
mediators the ability to alter the course of negotiations. In using credibility leverage,
mediators are able to increase the likelihood that belligerents will sign a lasting peace
agreement. While not defined in terms of brute strength, the dimensions of credibility
leverage are equally as important for mediation efforts than those of capability leverage.
Credibility leverage is a function of three concepts: mediators wield credibility
leverage insofar as they have past historical ties to any of the belligerent parties, cultural
ties to any (or all) of the warring groups, and/or they are able to offer post-agreement
monitoring. The components of credibility leverage are highly context-dependent. In
other words, not all mediators will have credibility leverage and not all mediators who
have credibility leverage will have it in all situations. The characteristics of the medi-
ator, the conflict, and the disputants all influence the presence or absence of credibility
leverage in a given conflict. Again, the contextual nature of credibility leverage adds
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even more weight to the dynamic conceptualization of leverage. Where previous stud-
ies glossed over the leverage of diverse mediator types, credibility leverage will capture
both the intangible and the context-specific components of leverage.
Before discussing the dimensions of credibility leverage, I first want to acknowl-
edge the role of bias in conflict mediation. The dimensions of credibility leverage over-
lap with proxies for bias, therefore one must consider how bias influences mediation.
While there is an ongoing debate in existing literature, I argue that bias contributes to
credibility leverage in that it gives mediators more influence over mediation outcomes.
Kydd (2003) evaluates the role of bias in mediation, finding that biased mediators are
more effective at conflict mediation than unbiased mediators. In his research, bias con-
tributes to the credibility of a mediator insofar as a biased mediator is expected to con-
tribute trustworthy information.2 Svensson (2007a) also highlights the role of bias in
conflict mediation, disaggregating biased mediation attempts that are on behalf of the
government versus those that are rebel-biased. He finds that government-biased medi-
ators have a positive effect on conflict mediation, predominantly because they mitigate
commitment problems. Rebel-biased mediators, on the other hand, do not have a statis-
tically significant impact on mediation. Savun (2008) also finds that biased mediators
are more likely to be successful than unbiased mediators. Importantly, Savun posits
that biased mediators are more likely to be able to persuade disputants to settle their
disagreements without the use of force by the mediators (44).
In the following paragraphs, I describe the dimensions of credibility leverage and
the ways in which they contribute to the overall leverage of a mediator. As previously
mentioned, a number of the components that contribute to credibility leverage refer to
bias, namely historical ties (which include past material bias) and cultural bias. In the
same vein as Kydd (2003), Svensson (2007a), and Savun (2008), however, I argue that
these dimensions will have a positive impact on civil war mediation efforts by mitigating
2In a later study, Kydd (2006) refines his evaluation of bias, stating that moderate levels of bias only
contribute to mediation success in repeated interactions, where a mediator has already established a
reputation. My conceptualization of credibility leverage, however, captures an environment of repeated
interaction and thus controls for Kydd’s revisions.
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commitment problems and communicating information to combatants. Moreover, the
dimensions of credibility leverage capture a component of leverage that is not based in
material strength but instead in the quality of the relationships between mediators and
disputants.
Past historical ties to the belligerent parties come in several forms. Colonial legacies,
previous intervention into the conflict, and/or the provision of prior material support to
any of the parties create ties between the mediator and the conflict. These ties build a
rapport through which mediators can influence belligerents and shape the mediation en-
vironment. Specifically, having a history of interacting with a country, whether through
colonial efforts or previous mediation attempts, serves as a signal that the mediator has
an interest in the country. Similarly, past historical ties indicate that a mediator made
some form of credible commitment to the country or group in question in the past.
Given this past credible behavior, disputants can have a higher degree of confidence
that the mediator will be more likely to be credible again in the future. Past historical
commitments also increase the likelihood of providing information to the negotiating
parties. Disputants can trust that mediators with past historical ties to their country, for
better or worse, will be more likely to exert continued influence over mediation efforts
than mediators with no historical ties.
Historical ties also involve the provision of material support to any of the belliger-
ent groups prior to the conflict. This dimension is not the same as the material strength
captured by capability leverage, because it does not involve the mediator using material
might or carrots and sticks to influence the mediation efforts. Instead, past material
support is an indicator of a form of bias. Again, bias increases the likelihood of suc-
cessful mediation because it demonstrates a mediator who not only cares about ending
hostilities but also about fully resolving the dispute in a way that matches the interests
of one or more of the involved parties (Savun 2008).
Cultural ties, be they religious or ethnic, also serve to increase the credibility lever-
age of a mediator. Again, mediators with specific ties to the conflict or any of the
warring parties will exert influence over the mediation efforts through their access to in-
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formation and their perceived interest in the conflict. They will be able to alter the costs
of settlement not through material means but through their cultural bias toward any of
the belligerent groups. In other words, cultural bias is expected to make mediation more
successful because belligerents will be able to trust that the mediator is both providing
accurate information and genuinely committed to reaching a peaceful settlement. As
such, mediators with cultural bias can be expected to exert credible influence over the
mediation process.
The final dimension of credibility leverage focuses on the ability of a mediator to
monitor and/or enforce an agreement. While some may say that monitoring and en-
forcement capabilities straddle the line between capability and credibility leverage, I ar-
gue that post-agreement assurances for involvement represent credibility leverage most
fully. A mediator that holds the potential for continued monitoring following the signing
of an agreement is a mediator that demonstrates commitment to the settlement and sig-
nals its interests in a more durable peace. According to Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild,
“The most effective means third parties can use to address the security fears of adver-
saries in the short run, though, is likely to be to promise to intervene to provide for the
safety of the parties” (2001, 193). Walter (1997) also emphasizes the indispensable role
of monitoring for civil war settlement. Mediators that have the potential for monitoring,
then, will exert credibility leverage and increase the likelihood of a peaceful resolution
to a civil war.
Before moving to a deeper evaluation of the dynamic conceptualization of leverage
in civil war mediation, it is crucial to reiterate that both capability and credibility lever-
age are context dependent. Stating that leverage is contextual both adds to the dynamic
nature of the concept and emphasizes that leverage is not constant for all mediators at all
times. While the dimensions of capability leverage vary according to the relative eco-
nomic and military strength of the mediator versus the government, credibility leverage
varies along historical and cultural lines.
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Applying Capability and Credibility Leverage to Civil War Mediation
Capability leverage encompasses economic and military influence while credibil-
ity leverage is a function of historical and cultural ties between the mediators and the
disputants and the mediator’s ability to monitor an agreement. With a clear conceptu-
alization of leverage now established, I shift focus to the more interesting substantive
puzzles. Which mediators are more likely to have the different dimensions of lever-
age, and more importantly, how does a dynamic conception of leverage influence the
likelihood of mediation success?
Who has leverage?
Given the definitions of capability and credibility leverage, which mediators can
be expected to exert leverage in conflict mediation efforts? The answer to this ques-
tion is a bit more complex than earlier studies that equated material-based versions of
leverage with great powers and other influential states and regarded all other mediators
as having little to no leverage. I will take the components of leverage piece by piece
to determine who has leverage in conflict mediation and what type of leverage they
have. In particular, I fit great powers, regional powers, other states, international orga-
nizations, non-governmental organizations, and individuals into the dynamic leverage
framework.3
Capability leverage, as a function of economic and military influence, is exerted
most fully by great power states.4 These states have the economic standing needed to
both fund mediation and extend carrots and sticks to put pressure on the mediation pro-
cess. Lastly, they have the military might necessary to deter cheating and to guarantee
enforcement. On this last dimension, the mere existence of a strong military serves to
bolster capability leverage; whether or not the mediator will actually use its military is
3My future research plans include verifying these assumptions using the available data on civil war me-
diation and my construction of leverage variables. At this point, the dimensions of leverage are too
disaggregated to reach conclusions.
4In our data, we define major powers according to the Correlates of War State System Membership List
(COW 2011).
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less important.
Other mediators that have access to capability leverage are, to a lesser extent, re-
gional powers, neighboring states, and the United Nations. Regional powers, for ex-
ample, may still have the economic clout necessary to influence the mediation process.
Neighboring states may be able to take advantage of their geographic proximity to the
conflict to overcome a lesser level of capability leverage. Neighboring states may not
inherently be wealthy or powerful in a material sense, but their accessibility to the con-
flict will give them the ability to exert capability leverage over nearby conflicts. More-
over, neighbors will tend to feel a sense of urgency to mediate the conflict and prevent
spillover effects; thus, neighbors will exert coercive measures and carrots and sticks to
facilitate a negotiated settlement. In certain cases, the United Nations has both the eco-
nomic resources and military influence to exert capability leverage as well. By stating
that the UN has military strength, I am merely implying that the UN has peacekeep-
ing forces that permit the organization to exert additional leverage over the mediation
process.5
Smaller states, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations
and individuals are most likely to exert credibility leverage while mediating conflicts.
These same actors, however, will not necessarily have access to capability leverage;
their power is not tangible, yet it is still likely to contribute to mediation success. Cred-
ibility leverage is more context-dependent than capability leverage. Again, by context-
dependent I mean that the historical ties and cultural ties of any given mediator to the
conflict will depend precisely on the identities of the mediator and of the belligerents.
A mediator may have credibility leverage in one conflict, but not another one. In spite
of the more context-based nature of this dimension of leverage, credibility leverage still
holds important influence over mediation outcomes.
There additionally exists an intersection between capability and credibility leverage.
Great powers and other mediators who have capability leverage may also have credi-
5Because peacekeeping forces vary in the size and strength, their contribution to capability leverage
is precarious. More often than not, then, peacekeepers will exert credibility leverage in displaying a
commitment to conflict resolution rather than capability leverage through coercion.
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bility leverage. For example, France would exert capability leverage as a great power
and also exert credibility leverage when mediating disputes in former colonies. On the
other hand, it is also possible for mediators to have neither capability nor credibility
leverage. A small organization, for example, does not have capability leverage nor does
it have credibility leverage in its first mediation attempt in a country with which it has
no past interactions. Over time, however, repeated interactions may allow the small or-
ganization to develop credibility leverage. The dynamic conceptualization of leverage
put forth in this paper, then, captures not only the diverse ways in which mediators can
influence the mediation process, but it also accounts for the development of leverage
over time.
Leverage and Mediation Success
With the dynamic concept of leverage now defined, I explore the second, and more
important theoretical question: how does leverage influence the likelihood of mediation
success? In other words, in what ways do capability and credibility leverage affect
mediation outcomes? For purposes of this paper, success is defined in two ways. First,
short-term success is defined as the mediator’s ability to achieve an agreement. Second,
success is defined in terms of the duration of peace following a civil war. Thus, success
is more than just reaching an agreement but also finding a settlement that lasts. Below, I
consider the ways in which mediators’ capability and credibility leverage alter both the
likelihood of reaching an agreement and achieving a durable settlement.
How do great powers, regional powers, and other mediators with capability lever-
age influence mediation outcomes? Capability leverage, as a function of wealth and
military capacity, gives mediators the coercive power necessary to force and/or expe-
dite an agreement. More specifically, however, capability leverage shapes mediation
outcomes in two specific ways: by altering the bargaining range and helping disputants
overcome commitment problems. Importantly, though, these two mechanisms increase
the likelihood of short-term success but are not expected to have long-term beneficial
effects.
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The first causal mechanism that links capability leverage in mediation to negotiated
settlements relates to bargaining in mediation. Capability leverage alters the bargaining
range for negotiating parties, specifically by expanding the acceptable range of agree-
ments. With capability leverage, mediators are able to use carrots and sticks to “increase
the opportunity costs of conflict...the most intrusive mediators can expand the number of
peaceful alternative outcomes that are mutually preferable to conflict” (Beardsley 2011,
32). As the bargaining range expands through the use of capability leverage, an agree-
ment becomes more likely. The use of carrots and sticks, however, does not guarantee
an increased likelihood of reaching an agreement that lasts.6
Second, capability leverage increases the likelihood of achieving an agreement fol-
lowing a civil war by helping belligerents overcome commitment problems that tra-
ditionally undermine negotiations and/or lead to the resumption of war. If mediators
have capability leverage, they have the economic and military capabilities necessary to
prevent cheating during negotiations and assure enforcement of agreement implementa-
tion.7 As Beardsley (2011) writes, implementation assistance increases the costs of both
cheating and reneging on an agreement. Moreover, capability leverage may assuage the
vulnerability certain belligerents may feel in signing an agreement. Thus, capability
leverage both increases the bargaining range and mitigates commitment problems. This
reasoning leads to my first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: All else equal, capability leverage will render mediators
more likely to achieve short-term success in the form of a negotiated settle-
ment.
Credibility leverage is expected to affect the mediation process in different ways
than capability leverage. Credibility leverage, being based upon historical and cultural
ties and the possibility of monitoring, is lacking in the carrots and sticks or coercive
6Svensson (2007b) suggests this idea, stating that mediators who rely on coercion and carrots and sticks
“do not have the resources to address the root-causes of conflicts...” (233). Credibility leverage, on the
other hand, fosters information and commitment in ways that facilitate more lasting agreements.
7Whether or not mediators with capability leverage actually enforce an agreement may not be important;
the perception that enforcement is possible may alter belligerents behavior and coerce cooperation.
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power that one sees with capability leverage. Nonetheless, credibility leverage is ex-
pected to lead to more successful mediation outcomes. In other words, credibility lever-
age is expected to lead to outcomes of more durable peace. Credibility leverage influ-
ences mediation outcomes by signaling a mediator’s commitment to long-term success
and by facilitating an exchange of credible information.
Because credibility leverage captures a mediator’s specific historic and/or cultural
ties to a conflict, disputants have reason to believe that the mediator’s motives are gen-
uine. The mediator with credibility leverage is not merely trying to strike a bargain at
any cost; rather, credibility leverage indicates vested interests in a conflict that allow the
mediator to foster an environment of cooperation and demonstrate a commitment to a
durable peace. In other words, credibility leverage signals that a mediator has interests
in the country and is committed to maintaining a relationship with the country. The
peacekeeping potential of certain mediators further bolsters this mechanism by offering
assurances of longer-term support.
When mediators rely on credibility leverage, they pursue communication-facilitation
strategies in lieu of manipulative or directive strategies, to use the terminology of
Bercovitch and Houston (2000). Communication-facilitation strategies do not depend
on the use of carrots and sticks but rather, they emphasize the role that communication
and cooperation can play in the dispute settlement process. Through communication,
information is exchanged and social ties are likely to be strengthened. Information pro-
vision will serve to assuage bargaining failures. Moreover, the information provision
role of credibility leverage sets it apart from its capability counterpart. While capability
leverage uses coercion to reach an agreement and thus leaves much information undis-
cussed or private, credibility leverage works to get as much information on the table as
possible. Mediators with historical and cultural ties will inherently have more informa-
tion about the conflict and at least one of the warring sides from the very beginning.
Moreover, the slower deliberation of mediation under credibility leverage will lead to
more information being revealed before an agreement is signed. Through commitment
and information mechanisms, mediators with credibility leverage are expected to have
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a positive effect on mediation success. Hypotheses 2a and 2b summarize the expected
relationship:
Hypothesis 2a: A mediator with credibility leverage is expected to have no
effect on the initial signing of an agreement.
Hypothesis 2b: Credibility leverage, however, will render mediators more
likely to achieve a more durable peace following a settlement.
Thus far, I have treated capability and credibility leverage in isolation. A number
of mediators, however, have both forms of leverage; the categories of leverage are not
mutually exclusive. Given the previous theories and hypotheses, I argue that possessing
both capability and credibility leverage will make a mediator more effective at conflict
mediation than other mediators. In other words, a mediator with the entire leverage
package will be more likely to both achieve a settlement and have that settlement last.
Table 1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships between capability and credibility
leverage and mediation outcomes.
TABLE 1: The Effect of Leverage on Mediation
Agreement Signed Agreement Lasts
Capability 3
Credibility 3
Both 3 3
Data and Research Design
This study focuses on building a more dynamic concept of leverage and testing its
effects on civil war mediation outcomes. The two components of leverage - capability
and credibility - are expected to have positive albeit unique effects on the likelihood
and nature of post-war settlements. To test the hypotheses regarding mediator leverage
and civil war resolution, I utilize the universe of civil war mediation attempts from
1989 through 2006 as identified by the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen,
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Bercovitch and Pospieszna 2011). The CWM data serves as a starting point for a larger
data project on mediation leverage. For each mediator within the dataset, I add specific
characteristics to capture leverage.8 The data is then aggregated at the mediation attempt
level to assess the overall levels of leverage in each mediation attempt. My unit of
analysis, then, is mediation attempt with a conflict dyad. A number of conflicts have
multiple mediation attempts within a single year. For example, Rwanda experienced
three distinct mediation attempts in 1991 and five attempts in 1992, as determined by
the mediation start and end dates provided by the CWM dataset. 9
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable of interest in this study is mediation success. Success, how-
ever, is a term with many meanings within the civil war resolution literature. For pur-
poses of this study I operationalize mediation success in two specific ways. First, I
consider whether or not an agreement was signed following mediation efforts and if so,
which type of agreement was signed. Second, success is operationalized as the quality
or duration of an agreement.
The first dimension of success refers to both the signing of an agreement and the
level of the agreement. The mediation outcome is operationalized as an ordered variable
with the following categories: (1) the mediation attempt failed and did not result in any
agreement; (2) the parties signed either a ceasefire or a peace process agreement; (3)
the parties reached a partial agreement; and (4) the mediation resulted in a full and
comprehensive peace agreement. Data for this variable comes from the UCDP Peace
Agreement Dataset version 2.0 (Ho¨gbladh 2011). Using an ordered variable allows for
a more nuanced understanding of the effects of certain types of mediation leverage. In
8The data for this paper is part of a broader project on leverage and bias in civil war mediation that I have
been working on with Elizabeth Menninga. I want to express my gratitude to her and my enthusiasm
about being a part of this bigger project on leverage, bias, and mediation.
9The number of mediators per mediation attempt ranges from one to nine. The aggregation of mediator
leverage within these attempts provides a tougher test of my hypotheses. Using the mediation attempt
rather than the individual mediator as unit of analysis, however, is essential in order to acknowledge that
multiple mediators within one mediation attempt are not acting independently from one another.
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this vein, the disaggregation of agreement types recognizes that not all agreements are
equal; partial or process agreements should not be treated in the same outcome category
as comprehensive peace agreements.
To assess the effects of mediator leverage on this first dimension of success, the
occurrence and type of an agreement, I utilize an ordered logit model. An ordered
logit model assesses the effects of explanatory variables across the ordered categories
of the dependent variable, in this case the mediation outcome. Mediation outcome
is an ordered dependent variable in the sense that the four outcome categories have
a distinct hierarchy where a failed mediation attempt is the worst and comprehensive
peace agreement is the best. Ordered logit models are restricted by the assumption that
all predictors have a uniform effect on the outcome categories; I test for this assumption
and consider its implications in the results section.
Second, mediation success is operationalized using a duration variable. Duration
measures how long, in months, a negotiated settlement lasts. While signing an agree-
ment is an important step, mediation truly becomes meaningful when it achieves a peace
that lasts and facilitates an end to the conflict trap. The duration variable is also derived
from UCDP’s Peace Agreement Dataset (Ho¨gbladh 2011).
Because the second dependent variable is a duration variable, I use a Cox propor-
tional hazards model to analyze the expected relationships between mediation leverage
and peace duration following an agreement. As an event history model, the Cox model
assesses the hazard of peace failing at any given time. The Cox model is also a pru-
dent choice in order to avoid the inefficiencies that arise when one makes incorrect as-
sumptions about the baseline hazard, because the Cox model leaves the baseline hazard
function unspecified. Moreover, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) write that “there
are few instances that we can think of where one would naturally prefer a parametric
duration model over a Cox-type event history model” in social science research (66).
From the Cox model, I will be able to determine the survival of peace given the specified
covariates.
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Explanatory Variables: Operationalizing Leverage
Staying true to the theoretical model outlined above, leverage is operationalized
as a dynamic concept that is comprised of both capability dimensions and credibility
dimensions. As such, different mediators bring different forms of leverage to the medi-
ation table. Capability leverage, defined in terms of a mediator’s economic and military
strength, allows a mediator to utilize carrots and sticks or coercion to achieve a set-
tlement between warring factions. I operationalize capability leverage following two
dimensions: economic and military capability.
First, capability leverage is measured in terms of economic power. As is mentioned
earlier, wealth bestows upon mediators a broader “toolbox” for mediation, and it gives
them the ability to utilize carrots and sticks to expedite and shape the mediation process.
I operationalize the economic dimension of capability leverage using a country’s gross
domestic product as derived from the Penn World Table (Heston, Summers and Aten
2002).10 In using GDP to measure capability leverage, I exclude non-country mediators
from having this dimension of leverage. This decision, though, is warranted in the sense
that non-state mediators will not have the economic capacity to shape the mediation
process using material incentives and/or punishments. The exception to this exclusion
is the United Nations. Given the size and scope of the UN, I have included their annual
budget in constant 2005 US dollars to capture their economic capability in comparison
to that of states (Hufner 2013).
The second dimension of capability leverage focuses on the military strength of a
country. As the theoretical framework of this paper suggests, military might offers the
potential for enforcement of any agreement that is reached. Moreover, military capa-
bility strengthens a mediator’s coercive power.11This aspect of capability leverage is
10The GDP of mediators and states is measured in the mediation start year as purchasing power parity
converted GDP per capita in constant 2005 US dollars. GDP per capita is then multiplied by population
to gain overall GDP measures for each country.
11It is important to note that leverage here is not tied to the use of military strength. Instead, if the
belligerents perceive that a mediator has a strong military, the mediator is thus enabled to utilize more
coercive means at the bargaining table.
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measured utilizing the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score from
the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset, version 3.02 (Singer, Bre-
mer and Stuckey 1972). CINC is an index that captures a country’s total population,
urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel,
and military expenditure. Again, only country mediators have a CINC score, thus non-
state mediators do not have access to this dimension of capability leverage. Certain
non-state mediators do, however, have the capacity deploy peacekeepers or other mon-
itoring forces; this is captured in measures of credibility leverage.
To deal with the contextual nature of capability leverage, I use relative scores of
GDP and CINC. In other words, the covariates for GDP and CINC are relative measures
of a mediator’s wealth and military capabilities in comparison to those of the govern-
ment taking part in the negotiations. Using a relative measure for both dimensions of
capability leverage recognizes that a mediator with a high GDP, for example, will not
have as much leverage if it is mediating a conflict in a country that has a similarly high
GDP. 12
In contrast to capability leverage, credibility leverage represents the less tangible
ways in which mediators alter incentives and generate peace agreements. Rather than
relying on coercion, credibility leverage shapes the course of mediation efforts by sig-
naling a mediator’s will or interest in achieving peace. Thus, credibility leverage fo-
cuses more on communication and commitment than it does on carrots and sticks. As
is aforementioned, a mediator wields this form of leverage if she has historical and/or
cultural ties to the conflict at hand.
Historical ties to a conflict entail a number of dimensions. First, mediators have
historical ties to a conflict if they have a colonial legacy in the country at war or if they
12The relative CINC score is measured by dividing the maximum CINC score of all mediators in the
mediation attempt by the CINC of the government of the warring country. The same process is used to
calculate relative GDP. Because the unit of analysis is mediation attempt, the analysis is complicated
by the presence of multiple mediators in a mediation attempt. I thus utilize the maximum values of
both CINC and GDP from all the mediators present in the conflict. I choose the maximum values
because they are most representative of the overall capability leverage in the mediation attempt. The
presence of mediators with lower GDPs or CINC scores should not undermine the leverage of the
stronger mediators in any way.
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have past interventions in the country at war. Historical ties is a dichotomous variable
that is coded 1 if a mediator meets one or more of the following criteria: (1) previous
mediation in the conflict; (2) colonial power in the country of the mediation attempt;
(3) Russia mediating a conflict in a former Soviet state. Data for previous mediation
attempts is provided by the CWM dataset, while data on colonial powers and Soviet
states is derived from the CIA World Factbook (CIA 2013). To deal with the presence of
multiple mediators in any given mediation attempt, the variable measures the combined
or aggregate history of the mediators. Combined history is coded as 1 if any of the
mediators present have a history with the conflict.
The second dimension of a mediator’s historical ties to a conflict is material in na-
ture. Material bias influences mediation outcomes insofar as it indicates a mediator’s
commitment to one or more sides in the conflict. Material bias is not a measure of the
ability to offer carrots and sticks; instead, it captures a mediator’s interests and commit-
ment. I operationalize material bias as a dichotomous measure. A mediator is coded as
having material bias if she has given aid to the government prior to the commencement
of mediation and/or given aid to the rebel group(s) prior to the mediation efforts.13 I
use UCDP’s External Support dataset to determine whether or not material support was
given to government and/or the rebels (Ho¨gbladh, Pettersson and Themne´r 2011).14
Again, where multiple mediators are present in a single mediation attempt, the variable
is coded as 1 as long as one mediator has provided material support to one or more of
the negotiating parties.
Cultural bias is another dimension of credibility leverage that is used to capture a
mediator’s potential influence over the settlement process. Cultural bias is defined by
ethnic and/or religious ties and is expected to make mediation efforts more successful
through commitment and credibility mechanisms. A mediator has cultural bias if he has
13In coding material bias, only aid to the specific rebel group(s) in the mediation attempt was recorded.
Aid to other rebel groups in the country is not coded as bias for the mediation attempt in question.
14UCDP disaggregates the type of external support and whether or not it was confirmed or alleged sup-
port. For the purposes of this study, I look at both alleged and confirmed support of any type that was
given within the ten years prior to the mediation effort.
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any ethnic ties or shared religious identities with the disputants.15 In mediation attempts
where at least one mediator has ties with any of the negotiating parties, the variable for
cultural bias is coded as 1.
Finally, credibility leverage involves a mediator’s ability to monitor the implemen-
tation of an agreement. As such, a peacekeeping variable is included in the models.
This variable is operationalized according to a mediator’s potential to send a peace-
keeping force. If a mediator has deployed peacekeepers in the past, then it is coded as
having the ability to send them in the future. The ability to send peacekeeping forces
underlines the commitment and thus the credibility leverage a mediator has over the
mediation process. Again, peacekeeping potential is aggregated within each mediation
attempt. Peacekeeping potential is coded 0 if no mediator in a mediation attempt has
peacekeepers at its disposal and 1 if any mediator within an attempt has the potential to
send either civilian forces, military observers, or military troops.16
Control Variables
The analysis includes a range of common control variables from the civil war reso-
lution literature. I control for conflict duration as measured in years from the start of the
conflict to the signing of an agreement. Conflict duration is expected to be positively
correlated with the probability of a settlement (Mason and Fett 1996). Data on civil
war duration comes from the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002;
Themne´r and Wallensteen 2012). Conflict intensity serves as an additional control vari-
able. Using the Uppsala Conflict Database Categorical Variables dataset (UCDP 2009),
conflict intensity is operationalized as either a minor conflict (25 to 999 battle deaths)
or a war (1000 or more battle deaths).17 The intensity of the conflict is determined
15Data for the cultural bias variables is derived from a number of sources. These include: the Minorities at
Risk Project (2009), the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior dataset (Asal, Pate and Wilkenfeld
2008), and the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman, Min and Wimmer 2009).
16Data for this variable is from the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (Soder 2012).
17There is also a third category in our dataset, coded 0, that indicates no ongoing conflict in the year of
the mediation.
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at the dyad level and measured in the start year of the mediation attempt. The litera-
ture widely recognizes the relationship between conflict intensity and the likelihood of
reaching a settlement, although the direction of this relationship remains uncertain.18
Zartman (2001) states that high intensity conflicts will create fear and animosity and
thus reduce the likelihood of an agreement, while Mason and Fett (1996) assert that
higher intensity conflicts should accelerate the signing of an agreement. Third, I control
for the incompatibility driving the conflict. The incompatibility control records whether
a conflict is over a territory, control of the government, or both, coded 1, 2, and 3 re-
spectively (UCDP 2009).19 According to Toft (2004), territorial conflicts will be more
difficult to settle. Finally, I control for the presence of peacekeepers in the country using
a dichotomous variable which is coded 1 if there were peacekeepers present in a country
during a mediation effort and 0 otherwise (Soder 2012). Importantly, this control is not
measuring the presence of peacekeeping forces following an agreement, only those that
were deployed before the mediation ended.
Results
I present the coefficients and their standard errors for the ordered logit models in
Table 2. Because relative GDP and relative CINC scores are correlated (correlation
= 0.672), the two variables are included in separate models to avoid multicollinearity
problems. Model 1 reports the effects of the independent variables, excluding relative
CINC scores, on mediation outcomes. The base category of the ordered outcome vari-
able is mediation failure, the second represents a ceasefire or peace process agreement,
the third indicates that the parties reached a partial agreement and finally, the fourth
category is that the mediators facilitated a comprehensive peace agreement.
18This intensity variable is suboptimal to more nuanced intensity measures that use cumulative battle
deaths. Given current data availability, I would not be able to have data on cumulative battle deaths for
conflicts beginning prior to 1989. Future extensions of this work will seek to ameliorate this deficiency.
19There are no occurrences of a conflict that is both territorial and over central control of the government
in our data.
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TABLE 2: Ordered Logit: Leverage and Mediation Outcomes
Model 1 Model 2
Capability Leverage
Relative GDP 0.0002
(0.0002)
Relative CINC 0.002 ∗
(0.001)
Credibility Leverage
Material Bias -0.433 -0.444
(0.274) (0.274)
Cultural Bias 0.332 0.249
(0.326) (0.323)
Historical Ties 0.055 0.001
(0.250) (0.249)
PKO Potential -0.346 -0.380
(0.239) (0.241)
Controls
PKO during mediation 0.802 ∗∗∗ 0.768 ∗∗∗
(0.261) (0.261)
Intensity 0.072 0.113
(0.192) (0.190)
Incompatibility 0.702 ∗∗∗ 0.662 ∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.236)
Conflict Duration -0.016 ∗∗ -0.012
(0.007) (0.007)
N 320 318
Pseudo R2 0.037 0.034
logL -402.734 -403.098
Standard errors in parentheses
Significance levels: ∗∗∗p < .01 ;∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Model 1 reveals that relative GDP has a positive effect on mediation outcomes,
meaning that as relative GDP increases or as the mediator exerts greater capability
leverage, a more comprehensive agreement becomes more likely. However, the co-
efficient does not attain statistical significance thus I cannot assert with confidence that
this economic dimension of capability leverage fulfills the theory. Credibility leverage
is predicted by hypothesis 2 to have no effect on the likelihood of initial success, or no
effect on the signing of an agreement. Fittingly, none of the credibility leverage mea-
sures reach statistical significance. The coefficients for material bias and peacekeeping
potential in Model 1 reveal that a mediator who has material bias or the ability to offer
monitoring renders a more comprehensive agreement less likely, all else being equal.
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Again, this relationship does not reach any level of statistical significance. Both cul-
tural bias and historical ties, as dimensions of credibility leverage, are not expected to
influence initial mediation outcomes in any significant way. While both variables have
positive effects on reaching a more comprehensive agreement, they are not statistically
significant.
With regards to the control variables in Model 1, mediation efforts with peacekeep-
ers present experience a 0.802 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of achieving a more
comprehensive settlement, while all other variables are held constant. This finding is
significant at the p=.01 level. The type of incompatibility has a statistically significant
and positive effect on mediation outcomes as well, while conflict duration renders a
more comprehensive agreement less likely. Finally, intensity does not have a statisti-
cally significant effect on the nature of a post-civil war settlement.20
Referring to Model 2 in Table 2, one can see that the relative CINC score, a proxy
for capability leverage, has a positive and statistically significant effect on mediation
outcomes. In other words, a one unit increase in the relative CINC score of a media-
tor results in a 0.002 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of achieving a more com-
prehensive peace agreement. In short, mediators with military capability increase the
likelihood of moving from no agreement to more complete settlements. The remaining
variables in the model maintain similar effects on mediation outcomes as they do in
Model 1, with one exception. The control for conflict duration no longer attains statis-
tical significance, though it has a negative effect on the achievement of an agreement
following a civil war.
The marginal effects of capability leverage on agreement outcomes are given in
Figures 1 and 2 in the appendix. Both figures reveal that, as relative CINC scores and
relative GDP move from their minimum values to their maximum values, the probability
of reaching a full settlement during a mediation attempt increases by approximately
0.5. The plots are substantively interesting in that they demonstrate a strong tendency
20This last finding is likely accounted for by the rudimentary measure of intensity being used. Future
data collection will seek to ameliorate this shortcoming.
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of mediators with capability leverage to achieve a full agreement versus other types of
agreements. This finding is promising for the initial establishment of peace following a
civil war. Questions arise, however, regarding the durability of these full agreements.21
An ordered logit model operates under the assumption that all independent variables
have a uniform effect across each response category. In the case of this paper, this re-
quirement would mean that each predictor has the same coefficients for predicting failed
agreements, ceasefire or process agreements, partial agreements, and full agreements.
The proportional odds assumption, however, is frequently violated. Given the risk of
violating the proportional odds assumption, I perform the Brant test following the or-
dered logit regression. The Brant test is superior to standard post-estimation analyses of
the proportional odds assumption in that it provides both an overall test of whether or
not the model violates the assumption, and it also tests the assumption for each variable
individually. Neither Model 1 nor Model 2 fulfills the proportional odds assumption,
but upon closer inspection, the only individual variable in violation is incompatibility.
Given the isolated nature of the violation, I remain inclined to report the ordered logit
results with confidence.22
In sum, the results from the ordered logit models weakly support hypotheses 1 and
2a. Capability leverage, as measured by the relative CINC scores of the mediator ver-
sus the government at the negotiating table, is the only one of the leverage variables
to have a statistically significant effect on the signing of an agreement. While relative
GDP is not significant, I can nevertheless conclude that capability leverage plays an im-
portant role in making a peace agreement more likely. Hypothesis 2a suggests that the
relationship between credibility leverage and reaching an agreement is null. Credibil-
ity leverage, however, becomes important for ensuring the durability of an agreement.
Again, the results of the ordered logit models support this null hypothesis as well.
21In calculating the marginal effects of relative GDP and relative CINC, material bias, cultural bias,
combined history, peacekeeping potential were held at their mode, current PKOs was held at 1, and all
other variables were held at their means.
22I have run a number of alternative models to correct for the violation of the proportional odds assump-
tion. The results remain consistent with those of Model 1 and Model 2, further indicating that the
violation of the proportional odds assumption is trivial with these model specifications.
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Table 3 presents the results for the survival analyses of mediator leverage and the
duration of post-civil war settlements. The models report the coefficients for the Cox
proportional hazards test. Positive values of a coefficient indicate a higher likelihood of
failure, where failure in this case indicates war resumption. In other words, variables
with a positive coefficient contribute to a higher likelihood that peace will fail following
an agreement. Conversely, negative coefficients represent a lower likelihood of failure,
or a more durable peace.23 24
TABLE 3: Cox Proportional Hazards Models: Leverage and Duration of Settlements
Model 3 Model 4
Capability Leverage
Relative GDP 0.0005∗∗
(0.0002)
Relative CINC 0.004∗
(0.002)
Credibility Leverage
Material Bias -1.568∗∗ -1.201∗
(0.762) (0.668)
Cultural Bias 0.568 0.680
(1.096) (1.102)
Historical Ties 0.617 -0.466
(1.220) (0.857)
PKO Potential 1.334 1.132
(0.963) 0.958
Controls
PKO during mediation 0.081 0.627
(0.636) (0.631)
Intensity -1.198∗∗ -0.631
(0.580) (0.538)
Incompatibility -0.833 -0.603
(0.767) (0.753)
Conflict Duration -0.030 -0.018
(0.031) (0.028)
N 116 118
logL -44.484 -45.107
Coefficients for Cox model reported; standard errors in parentheses
Significance levels: ∗∗∗p < .01;∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
23An alternative presentation of the results would show hazard rates, or the hazard of peace failure. Both
coefficients and hazard rates, while interpreted in different manners, yield the same results.
24The Cox proportional hazard models conform to the proportional hazards assumption.
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Model 3 tests the effects of mediation leverage on the peace duration following a
civil war, including the relative GDP variable. Relative GDP has a positive and statisti-
cally significant coefficient, thus a mediator’s economic capability is expected to render
peace more likely to fail following an agreement. This finding supports the theoretical
expectations in that capability leverage is mainly expected to facilitate the signing of an
agreement, not the duration of peace following that agreement. Material bias, as a proxy
for credibility leverage, has a coefficient of -1.568; this effect is statistically significant
at the p=.05 level. Mediation attempts with material bias, then, will make peace endure
longer than those without material bias, all else being equal.
While the result for material bias generates support for my hypotheses, the other
dimensions of credibility leverage do not offer equally optimistic results. The coeffi-
cients for cultural bias, historical ties, and peacekeeping potential are 0.568, 0.617, and
1.334, respectively. The positive coefficients, again, indicate that these variables reduce
the duration of peace following a negotiated settlement. These results, however, are not
statistically significant. For the control variables, only intensity attains statistical signif-
icance; more intense civil conflicts are expected to have a more durable peace following
an agreement, holding all other variables constant. Incompatibility and conflict duration
also have negative coefficients, thus contributing to longer peace survival times. Peace-
keeping presence during mediation does not increase the likelihood of peace survival.
These three control variables, however, are not statistically significant.
Finally, Model 4 assesses the role of a mediator’s leverage on peace duration with
relative CINC scores in lieu of relative GDP. Relative CINC has a coefficient of 0.004
and is statistically significant at the p=.10 level. As the relative CINC score between
the mediator and the warring government increases, the likelihood of peace failing in-
creases. This is consistent both with the effects of capability leverage in Model 3 and
with the hypotheses. Material bias, as in Model 3, has a negative and statistically sig-
nificant coefficient. Thus, material bias renders the post-conflict peace more likely to
last. The remainder of the variables, both the credibility leverage covariates and the
controls, have similar effects in Model 4 as they do in Model 3. There is one excep-
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tion to this, however; historical ties within this model specification have a coefficient
of -0.466. In other words, historical ties between a mediator and a belligerent group
increase the duration of peace, all else being equal. The effect does not attain statistical
significance.
Figures 3 and 4 in the appendix graph the expected survival time of peace following
a negotiated settlement. As the hypotheses state, credibility leverage is expected to
have a positive effect on long-term success following mediation efforts. Figure 3, then,
compares material bias, the statistically significant dimension of credibility leverage, to
relative CINC. With these plots, I can assess the relative effects of the two variables
on mediation success. The graph suggests that credibility leverage as measured by
material bias leads to a longer duration of peace following settlement than the proxies
of capability leverage. Moreover, there is a stark drop in peace survival time when
relative CINC is at its maximum value. The same findings hold true in Figure 4 with
regards to material bias and relative GDP. Material bias leads to longer survival times
than both relative CINC and relative GDP. The expected survival times confirm that
credibility leverage is indeed a powerful tool for mediators who hope to achieve lasting
peace.
The Cox proportional hazards results offer initial support for my hypotheses. More
specifically, both models indicate that at least one dimension of credibility leverage,
material bias, leads to a more durable peace. Thus, a mediator with credibility lever-
age may not have an effect on the initial signing of an agreement, but the mediator is
able to contribute to a lasting peaceful outcome. Additionally, the Cox results suggest
that mediators with capability leverage do not necessarily lead to long-term successful
outcomes. Instead, capability leverage may actually degrade the probability of a more
durable peace.
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Conclusions
How do different mediator types influence mediation outcomes and the likelihood of
a lasting peace following a negotiated settlement? In assessing the effects of mediators,
it is crucial to acknowledge that not all mediators are created equally. The size, scope,
strength, and resources of conflict mediators vary greatly. What Norway can do to
mediate a conflict cannot be thought of as synonymous to what Jimmy Carter can do. In
other words, different types of mediators wield different mediation “tools.” In spite of
the variation in mediator types, the extant literature has done little to explore the diverse
sources of leverage wielded by different mediators. This study has filled that blatant gap
in existing research by seeking to investigate a dynamic notion of mediation leverage.
While the discussion of leverage in conflict mediation is not entirely novel, the
dynamic model of leverage presented here strengthens existing work and will allow
for the development of novel insights regarding mediator characteristics and mediation
outcomes. The statistical analysis provides support for the idea that different types of
leverage have different effects on mediation outcomes. Thus, scholarly work in civil
war mediation can no longer discount the role of those “weak” mediators that do not
hold the power of coercion. Each type of mediator has its own important role in civil
war mediation.
Leverage, in its dynamic form, is a function of both capability and credibility. While
capability involves economic and material measures of influence, credibility leverage
captures the less tangible forms of influence such as historical ties, material and cultural
bias, and the desire to offer monitoring following an agreement. Within this theoretical
framework, mediators with capability leverage are expected to facilitate the signing of
an agreement and mediators with credibility leverage are expected to facilitate a more
durable peace following a settlement. Using the universe of mediation attempts from
1989 through 2006 as specified by DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna (2011), I found
initial support for my theory of mediation leverage.
This study is an exploration into a richer, more dynamic conceptualization of lever-
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age, both theoretically and empirically. While I have found support for my theory of
leverage and civil war mediation, there remains much work to be done. First, I hope to
incorporate a political dimension into capability leverage. A political capability mea-
sure would strengthen the concept of capability leverage, and it would give due credit
to those large intergovernmental organizations or regional powers that have the politi-
cal know-how and ability to broker peace between belligerent groups. The second and
larger task in ameliorating the dynamic theory of leverage is to consider how to aggre-
gate the individual parts of capability and credibility leverage empirically. In its current
form, the models treat each component as independent. I would like to explore how ma-
terial bias, cultural bias, and historical ties, for example, can be aggregated using factor
analysis to form one distinct measure of credibility leverage. This process would create
more parsimonious measures of leverage that could then be used within other studies.
Finally, beyond the theoretical and empirical developments offered in this work,
the discussion of capability and credibility leverage has important policy implications
as well. Given the unique effects of capability versus credibility leverage, it is evident
that different types of mediators have different effects on mediation outcomes. Thus, the
mediation selection process should include some consideration of the effects of different
types of leverage. To achieve a lasting peace, the international community must ensure
that they are using the right tool for the job at hand.
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